Category: Historical Prices


Had a request to overlay the sales stats discussed earlier with week, with prices… so lets knock that out. It’s hard to decipher these graphs if I pack too much in, and I’ve already done similar stuff for the last decade anyway, so I figured I’d just do the 90′s (and ’89 just cause I have it) today. So, without further ado…

90's Sales and Prices

As we can see here, prices were pretty tame in the 90′s… at least compared to what we’ve just been though. I guess I should have scaled that better, oh well, too late now. It’s hard to draw too much from this graph anyway, but if you look close you see that overall in years where sales looked to be increasing from the prior year, prices also rose… but when sales seemed to decline year-over-year, prices tended to only hold, or even go down a bit themselves.

90's Sales and Prices

Also prepared this little analysis, the sales data is the same, but the price data is adjusted… firstly it’s converted into a 3-month moving average to smooth it out, then it’s measured as the month-over-month change in that moving average. This again shows prices also share something of a seasonality, as price gains tend to be strongest in the spring/summer months, months that also tend to see strengthening sales tallies from month-over-month. Conversely, when sales start their seasonal declines, price growth drops, and come the fall usually go negative.

A month ago I did some digging, and pulled together a good set of data from the ’90′s… so today I figured we’d take a look at some of those numbers today, and since sales is a hot (or not so hot, perhaps) topic at the moment, we’ll start there. Here’s a look at sales going back to January 1989 all the way through June 2010 (final numbers, not the preliminary number announced earlier this month).

Historical Monthly Sales

It’s interesting to look back in time. Compared to the volatility witnessed in the last few years, the 90′s were almost stoic, but they had a few notable periods. If you look closely at 1992, while they had comparatively high sales throughout the entire year… coincidently, that was actually of something of a CMHC inspired boom of it’s time, as that January was when CMHC lowered the downpayment requirement from 10% to 5%.

As we move forward we see sales then start to decline, eventually bottoming out in a rather dismal 1995. This was the result of a large inventory spike (we’ll try to examine that another day) that started to build in ’93, bypassed prior record highs (6,332 – June ’82) before peak inventories eventually settling in the mid-to-high 7,000′s in ’94 and remained their until ’96, and didn”t finally return to normal levels until ’98. This seemed to be a major aftershock of the building boom in the late 70′s/early 80′s, and that it took 15 years to finally totally play out is kind of a sobering thought considering our current situation.

Interestingly, ’96 also witnessed the a then record 1,400 sales in a month that May. It was credited at the time as being the result of an influx of military families coming to the city. Whatever it was, ’96 seems to be the turning point, and from there on sales started to gradually grow, and eventually get inventory back to manageable levels. Then of course we get to the last decade, which we’ve discussed in great detail already, so I’ll spare you further dissection… for now.

Historical Seasonality

Having this new data, also allowed me to do some better seasonality calculations. Above is a graph of monthly sales as a percentage of annual sales. I used the median figure, but the average was pretty much the same, and included one standard deviation above and below to give you an idea of the typical range.

Historical Seasonality

That doesn’t mean much without context though, so lets add in this years sales though the first six months of the year (once again, these are the final figures, not the preliminary ones, so these are not undervalued), and the trend lines are projected based on that. We see we had above average sales for the first four months, especially in April… but it’s since fallen off in a big way, and if the trend continues could dive below one standard deviation from the expected course.

This doesn’t make any statement about a months sales nominally vs that month historically, merely how they compare to sales levels experienced that year vs the expected curve.Though, for what it’s worth based on normal seasonality and the sales through six months we’re on pace for only about 17,000 on the year… but that would require we have levels somewhere close to the median line, if we stay where we are currently we’ll come in well below that. Even at 17K, that is still 2K below the EREB’s latest revised forecast, and 4K below their original forecast for 2010.

Worst. Call. Ever.

This past week I’ve been digging through some newspaper archives, mainly I was looking for stats and possible story ideas (and did pretty good on both fronts), but also found it fascinating reading through the articles and getting a sense for the flavor of the time.

The further I went back, the less and less that became available, but there was multitudes there from the 90′s, and looking back at the time in hindsight knowing what we do today it was rather remarkable, as even though it was very stable compared to either the 80′s before it, or the 00′s, the high and lows within it were no less celebrated or bemoaned by those living it.

But I’ll save discussing the 90′s for another day, today I’m going to discuss another article I stumbled across… actually, just one item from it. It was an article that appeared in the Globe and Mail on July 7th, 1982, titled “Vancouver house prices plunge” and actually discusses the various markets around the country. This was a very tumultuous time as the title suggests.

Interest rates after years of slow but steady increases just months earlier had spiked to levels previously thought unimaginable (5-yr Fixed Mortgage rates in September ’81 hit their all time high of 21.43%, up almost 7% from just a year earlier) and while off the peak were still extremely high, this of course had a cooling effect on housing in several markets.

For those needing a refresher, consult the graphs in this post. Towards the end they get to Edmonton, and the Edmonton Real Estate Board happily touted that while price increases had slowed, they were still going up as of June, even in spite of interest rates. Then there was this paragraph.

The number of sales last month for residential property on the multiple listing service in Edmonton was off by more than half from what it was a year ago. There were 373 houses sold in June compared to 802 in June, 1981. The number of places up for sale was nearly the same in both periods – about 1,800. ”Be positive. Now is a good time to buy. If people can hang on for a year or two (with high mortgage interest rates), real estate will be a good long-term investment,” said Bob Weist, an administrator with the Edmonton Real Estate Board.

Yeah… be positive! It’s a good time to buy! Just ignore those interest rates, real estate only goes up!

As it turns out… not so much.

Now, it’s easy to look back now and nit-pick knowing that after those June ’82 numbers it was all down hill of real estate in the city of Edmonton. And, this is also coming from an industry flack whose job it is to pump the stuff, so we still have to take it with a grain of salt considering the source. But what really takes such a statement from being merely bad, to being spectacularly bad, is that it was just weeks later that interest rates also fell off the cliff. So not did this turn out to be the absolute worst possible moment lock in price wise… but you double it up by locking in at a horrendous interest rate.

Rather than a great investment, it’s more like financial hara-kiri.

Just for example, to finance an amount equivalent to the average home, $94,042, with a 25 yr amortization at 19.1% interest, would cost $1510 a month. That may not sound all that bad to us today, but remember this is 1982, and the median family income in Edmonton is $26,680… thus the cost to service such a mortgage would cost a staggering 68% of a households annual salary. Forget about eating, you’d be lucky to pay your taxes… which is probably why sales had already slowed to a crawl, no one could buy anymore.

And after 5 years, and over $90,000 worth of payments, you will be the proud owner of a whole $1,313 in equity… or you would have that much if the house wasn’t worth just $80,000 ($14,000 less than you paid for it)… leaving you about $12,700 underwater. In other words you’ve spent over $90,000, and all for the privilege to still owe the bank $92,700, on a property now only worth $80,000. I don’t know about your guys, but that would be the last time I went to the EREB for investment advice.

Over the entire life of that mortgage (using actual numbers and 5yr terms), it would cost just over $300,000 over the 25 years to pay that off… and adjusting for inflation it comes out to $447,000 in current dollars. So you’re probably saying to yourself at this point, that seems steep, but you’re not sure what to make of it. Well, lets compare to a few other scenarios.

Lets say, instead of buying immediately in the wake of Bob’s statement, you wait six months. At this point prices have dropped off a little over 4K, but the biggie is interest rates have dropped almost 5%, to 14.34%. Your monthly payments (for the next 5 years) are now down to $1104… a saving of over $400 a month for the exact same place, that’s HUGE. Over the life the mortgage this would cost you $257,000 to pay off nominally (or $371,000 in real dollars)…. a savings of 16% (or 20% in real terms) just for sitting on your wallet for a mere six months.

Not bad, but lets say you waited a whole year. By now prices are down 9K, and interest rates have settled in at 12.98%… now it’d only cost you $957 a month to carry the debt. So, you’re already not only paying a whopping $553 less per month, but more of what you are paying is going towards equity rather than debt servicing. And the savings you’d have over the life of the loan are now 27% nominally, and 33% inflation adjusted.

And it only gets better as time goes on as prices continue to soften and interest rates drop. Lets go four years out to the summer of ’86. Average price now is $78,500, interest rates are now below 11%, and you’re monthly payment would be mere $762, almost half of what it would have been if you foolishly bought when Bobbo and the EREB told you it would be a good idea… and over the life of your loan it would cost $201,500 nominally, and $260,000 inflation adjusted. Some mammoth savings.

(I’m sure some of you smart cookies wondered to yourself just how can I have projections for the entire 25yr life inflation adjusted of a mortgage started in 1986 as it wouldn’t have expired just yet and we don’t know what going to happen with inflation through 2011. Good catch. The answer is, I assumed a continuance of our current 1.8% year-over-year inflation to continue through expiration. I assume that will be close enough to actual, and even if things did go completely crazy any impact would be negligible at this point anyway).

Maybe you’re wondering, what if I was just that genius and/or lucky to hit absolute bottom price wise. Well, that would have been February ’86 when prices dipped to $68,253… and in that case you could have skated away with an interest rate at 11.94% and a monthly carrying cost of $716. Less than half what it could have been. And over the life of your mortgage it would have cost you $184,000 nominally, or $241,000 inflation adjusted. In other words, buying that “good long-term investment” would have cost you 63% more nominally, or a whopping 86% in real dollars.

Not my idea of a good investment… but it’s not my job to sell houses…

Again, it’s easy to sit back and take pot shots and normally I don’t bother (though I do enjoy it more than a little)… but just looking back at that statement, and knowing the timing of not just prices, but interest rates, and how they were both literally on the cusp of collapsing, makes it not just a bad call, but an epically bad call. One for the ages. One that probably even makes the likes of Jim Joyce or Jorge Larrionda feel a little bit better… probably doesn’t do much for England, but at least Armando Galarraga got a ‘vette out of it all.

I guess the point I’m trying to make is that when locking into decisions that are going to play out over decades, we need to be aware of the dangers up front. The future is uncertain, hell, right now the current is uncertain, and incorrect assumptions can have disastrous consequences.

We may not be facing the risk of high interest rates right up front like they were in 1982, but we must recognize the danger of locking into high levels of debt while rates are low… cause they can go up, and if they do your level of debt remains… and high leverage and high interest rates are a lethal combination. Heck, even just buying assets at inflated prices in the absence of interest rate considerations can be a financial life sentence.

To paraphrase someone much brighter than I, our economic cycles are long, but our memories are short.

You may have noticed that a few of the blowhard bloggers out there have recently been making the call that the market beginning to turn. Of course any moron can just up and prattle away with such declarations, but I aim a special sort of moron and actually examine things a little deeper.

So I figured it was a good time to take a look at just what such a turn plays out like. Edmonton (and Alberta) are in a bit of a special situation as our bubble hit earlier, and actually topped out in 2007 (leaving us in something of a suckers rally at present), which gives us the unique perspective of having seen this movie just recently, thus some excellent data on just how it works.

Not that there is a lack of comparison others out there, with the implosion of the US housing bubble there are umpteen cities that have had serious housing downturns… but we like to think “it’s different here” and thus need a local example (even though, statistically, what happened down there was a carbon copy of what happened here where the market turned).

Anyway, talk is cheap, lets build. Here is a look at what happened in 2007, as well as dashed lines representing historical averages to give up an idea of typical seasonality in regards to sales and inventory levels.

Hitting the corner

What we see here is as the year begins inventory is a fair bit lower than normal, while sales are a fair bit higher… obviously this is a “sellers market” and is ripe for rapid price escalation, as witnessed. This continued through the winter months, but come spring we started to see a divergence as inventory started to grow rapidly. Come May, sales were still strong and prices peaked at $400,000… but inventory for the first time in almost two years was above the historical norm, and still picking up steam.

Through the summer we see sales fall off significantly. As we can see from the dashed line, this is a quite normal seasonal movement.. it’s the degree to which indicates that the market has became fatigued, as the line drops from well above historical norms, back to them, and even below.

Inventory on the other hand goes ballistic. To get an idea of just how drastic that curve is, bear in mind that prior to May ’07 the record high for inventory was 5,077, and the dashed line indicating that 3-4,000 is the norm. By September they were pushing 10,000 (9,918 to be exact), a mark they would blow past a year later for what that’s worth.

What’s interesting to watch is the behavior of price. Price is also often seasonal, and peaks in the spring, but its downward fluctuations are typically limited to $3,000-5,000… not $25,000-50,000. Obviously seasonality only accounts for a small fraction of the seen declines, and the market conditions (including consumer sentiment) has a far larger impact.

The significant price declines didn’t even hit until August, but that time inventory was already over 9,000 and starting to level off… and sales had already returned to “normal” territory over a month earlier. This is obvious evidence that price fluctuations tend to lag the actual market conditions in such situations.

Turning the corner

Which brings us to twenty-ten. Here, even with merely average sales volumes, and inventory very high and growing, we’re still somehow seeing price gains. Rather remarkable behaviour on the surface, but it’s a testament to what low interest rates and a ton of hype can do. Of course no one bothers telling the consumer that inventory is actually still at obscene levels, there is no money in that… that’s all in generating transactions, and you can’t instill a sense of urgency in people if they think the market is flooded. After all, marketing and sales is all about eliciting action right now.

Which I guess is kind of the point of this entire post, that being that we shouldn’t be fooled by price movements even when we perceive the market to be weakening. Prices are prone to throwing in a few head fakes, especially during the blow off phase of the market. Declining levels of buyers can actually make the market more susceptible to price gains in the waning days of a rally.

So don’t be fooled if prices still drift up a little, it’s just the blow off… all indicators are pointing down, and showing no signs of changing.

Still recovering from the Olympics hangover. As if having to go outside and face the sun wasn’t enough, apparently they expect me to be functional at work and interact with people in a civil manner… all the while going through nordic combined withdrawl. Yeah it’s rough.

Anyway, I’m busily trying to catch up on all the things I missed while in my little staycation. While reading through some real estate news items I came across one item talking about a suspected inventory pinch that will develop this spring in much of the country and would result in further inflation of prices.

Got me thinking tgat I hadn’t touched on that sort of thing in awhile, so it would be a good topic to cover. Beyond that, I want to look at the actual psychology of the market that causes this… and as here in Alberta we’re in a different phase of the bubble than the rest of the country, we have a unique opportunity to examine what happened here.

Inventory and Price

So, lets take a look at how inventory levels have recently co-existed with price levels. Here’s I’ve plotted out active inventory and the year-over-year change in prices (of the median SFH, using a 3-month moving average). Up until 2006 we can see a very intuitive relationship, fluctuations are moderate and we can see that generally when inventory is low, appreciation is higher… conversely when inventory is high, appreciation is lower. Particularly apparent in 2002 when there was a noticeable pinch in inventory and soon thereafter prices took off a bit before both returned to their means.

Then we look at what happened in 2006… the economy was cooking and real estate appreciation was strong in 2005 and as we know, the feds started to take the axe to lending requirements… and inventory started to get pinched, and prices went ballistic. Prices eventually topping out at almost 60% YoY appreciation all the while inventory remained at extremely low levels. Then just as suddenly those gains started to return to Earth and inventory went crazy.

Now, all that we knew and have discussed from all sorts of angles. What I would like to discuss is why.

In the midst of the boom, everytone thought that migration was just so great that the inventory shortage was legitimate (ignoring how preposterous the premise of running out of land in a city located in the middle of the prairies is, a mania is a mania, I guess). Buying and selling was the in thing to do, greed and fear were the prevailing emotions (and still largely are). It became a seemingly infinite loop, prices kept going up, which just kept feeding the beast, and a suddenly rapid expansion of available credit only served to throw gas on the fire.

So speculation ran rampant, and not just on the demand side, but also on the supply side. See, when prices are rising quickly sellers a lured in by the paper gains, and hold properties off the market. So, not only was demand artificially high, but supply artificially low… which of course results in further price escalation, and the loop just keeps reaffirming itself.

But that can only continue so long, and eventually the market reaches an absolute limit when the credit runs out… at that point, the music stops. First year-over-year gains start to slow, then month-over-month gains dwindle and eventually reverse, and this starts sucking the air out of the bubble and as first-time buyers have been priced out there is no fresh money to keep the gears turning.

As a result sales start to slow, and prices start to reverse course… this causes the speculators, who had previously been holding their properties off the market, to rush them onto it. This floods the market, and turns it into a “buyers market”… and much like in sellers markets, when sellers become reluctant to sell fearing they’ll miss out on the gains that could be achieved should prices go higher… in buyers markets, buyers become reluctant to buy fearing they’ll miss out on discounts achieved should prices go lower. Again, an example of a behaviour serving to reinforce itself.

But there is even further trouble caused by such an extended boom and increased speculative activity… that is, builders overbuild. New construction serves a very important purpose in balancing the real estate market in the long term, it maintains balance. But in a speculative bubble, demand increases artificially at the same time supply is decreased artificially… this means builders start pounding out new housing at a rate much higher than is actually warranted, and the longer it continues, the more overbuilt you end up. That’s how we ended up with inventory levels more than double any prior highs, and three times normal levels.

When the boom was at it’s peak many denied the existence of speculation, but one need look no further than the explosion of inventory in the immediate aftermath of the market cooling to prove otherwise. 8,000 units didn’t magically appear over the span of mere months (and rocketed even higher a year later), they were always there… a shadow inventory, if you will.

After the last year of credit fueled mania, we can expect the same effect to be witnessed in several markets across the country (to varying degrees)… if I’m correct, we’ll even see it here again, though probably not quite to the levels witnessed in ’07 and ’08, but significant none the less. Again proving that a market is no more rational than it’s participants… which in this case, is not very.

Greetings all! We’re going to do something a little different today, and that’s very interesting… or at least I think it’s interesting. I’m going to take a look at the changes the CMHC made, how it affected lending and even touch on why what happened here wasn’t all that different than what happened in the US. I was meaning to get this done a bit faster, but turns out it’s a little more time consuming than I thought it would be, ’tis complicated stuff.

Before we start, I compiled this little graph as something of an all-in-one backgrounder for this post. The contents are nothing that hasn’t been discussed ad nauseam already on this blog. This is just so you can consult for reference. So here that is.

Background Info

This is all concerning Edmonton. We have median household incomes, median single-family-home prices and average 5-year fixed rate mortgage interest rate. Incomes and home prices are inflation adjusted, and are in 2007 dollars. Why 2007? Well, that’s what the data set came in for incomes, and to compile the final graph I could not adjust it… and frankly it’s close enough to today’s dollars, All figures in this post are in 2007 dollars.

CHMC Changes and Effects

Enough of that, on to the good stuff. This is a graph documenting the changes in CMHC lending standards, and it’s effect on how much money a person could qualify for. These percentages hold true whether you make $1/year or $1,000,000/year, so income level have no effect on this measure.

We set our base effect (0%) as the maximum amount one could qualify for going into 2006 when amortizations were limited to 25 years. We’re using 6% as a steady interest rate through the entire period. We know in reality they float, but for theoretical and practical purposes we’ll use 6%, and as we could see in the first graph interest rates were generally right around 6% from ’03 through early ’09 (and are likely to return there once the “emergency rates” expire).

For example a person, lets call him Dave, is making $60,000 a year, could qualify for about $250,000 in financing assuming he has no debts in January of 2006 or any time early. Just for example purposes, and to use a nice round number.

In March ’06 we saw the first mandated change, and that was extending amortizations to 30 years. That change allows Dave to qualify for ~7.5% or ~$18,500 more than he did before. They also dropped the need for a 5% downpayment, unfortunately the effects of that can’t really be quantified. We’ll discuss it’s grander effects a bit later, but for our purposes here we just kind of ignore it.

So we jump ahead a few months to June. Here Harper and Co. really open the flood gates. Sure they again extend amortizations another 5 years, now to 35… but the real coup de gras was insuring interest-only mortgages. That one blew the doors right off.

Here I split the line just so we can see the effects of the amortization extensions (green line), as other wise they would be lost in the effect of interest-only payments. The move to 35 year ams would have allowed Dave to borrow another ~5.5% above and beyond. So he could now borrow 13% or $32,500 more than he could five months earlier.

We follow that green line a little further, and in November the feds started insuring 40 year amortizations. That allows Dave to borrow another 4.1% (notice the diminishing returns on the 5 year extensions?), and that’s 17.1% more than he could borrow less than a year prior. For a guy making $60,000/year, that’s another $42,750 in financing he could qualify for. No small increase.

Of course that’s nothing compared to what the interest-only option offers. That route offered 28.9% more financing (or about $72,000 for Dave). Now we consider that this financing wasn’t just available to Dave, but to everyone in Canada.

We recall that real estate in Edmonton (and Alberta as a whole) was pretty hot in ’05. It was the talk of the town, everything was selling and the economy was cooking… then we hit ’06 the feds take an axe to lending standards, and over the first six months all these hormonal consumers find themselves with greatly increasing levels of available financing.

Now go back to the first graph, and notice that is right when real estate prices start going vertical. It’s not a coincidence. Real estate was on hot, but a controlled burn and sustainable… but all this suddenly available financing just threw gas on it… and at this point it just became a perfect storm.

Buyer Pool

Obviously when available financing increases in a big way… so does the pool of potential buyers. I apologize that you need to use your imagination a little with this graph. The incomes breakdowns are only available on an annual basis, so gains made over the year really cannot be represented other than those jumps. Really we’re only focusing on 2006 though, the rest are just there for reference sake.

This is a graph of the percentage of households that can qualify for $200,000 of financing at 6% interest (again, assuming no other debts). Up until ’05 it was steadily around 57% of households as incomes were stable. Then in ’06, incomes jumped an impressive 8.5% ($4800) YoY… this yield a 3.8% improvement in households that qualify. It’s important to note that relationship. If we follow the blue line further (it’s conditions are held constant with 25yr ams) we could see another 4.2% ($2600) YoY improvement in incomes in ’07, yielding a 3% improvement in qualifications.

Now we compare that to the effects changes in lending standards had on qualifications. Extending amortizations to 30 years increased qualifications by about 2.6%… 35 years was another 2.4%… and finally 40 years was another 1.5%. So if amortizations were merely lengthened from 25 year to 40 years it would have increased qualifying households by 6.5% in total. In Edmonton that represents about 32,000 households, which is by itself a VERY big one year increase in potential demand.

But again, like the prior measure, it was the interest-only option that blew the doors off. That option rocketed up the qualifying population to 74.4%, an increase of 14.1% over what it was just five months prior, and representing an influx of roughly 69,000 households that wouldn’t have otherwise qualified for that much financing.

Obviously that figures is theoretical, as credit scores would disqualify several, most already own, some aren’t looking, etc etc. So, you can just throw out that 69,000 figure. But assuming standard distribution the percentages should be fairly accurate over what had previously been available… in fact, if anything they’re understated.

You see, typically the required downpayment would be a limiting factor to buying. So, even if one could qualify for sufficient financing to purchase, they still needed to have a downpayment and this kept many potential first time buyers from buying… but one of the first lending requirements stripped was effectively removing the need for downpayments by allowing them to be borrowed. This not only further opened the door, but opened it to much riskier borrowers, ones without a established savings and those without skin in the game.

Obviously that effect can’t be easily quantified, but it was just one more control eliminated that allowed the housing market to bubble out of control. People no longer needed to plan or save to earn the right to buy… they could just pop down to the bank, piggyback a couple loans and have themselves a house. Hell, they didn’t even have to be able to cover closing costs.

That’s why those that argue that the mere absence of widespread “subprime” loans means we’re not in a bubble like the US is missing the forest for the trees. Look at their overall effect… they allowed people to a) borrow more money than they would otherwise have, and b) allowed more people to borrow money. So maybe we didn’t have as many “subprime” loans… instead we just kept lowering the bar for prime until it had the same effect.

They had an influx of new demand, and with it an expanding pool of available financing (of which lowering interest rates only further expanded)… that will heat up real estate markets, and then it just becomes a vicious cycle and feeds itself until all fundamentals have been so far bypassed the only thing supporting the market is it’s own momentum… and when that runs out, Wile E. Coyote meets gravity.

That’s not to say the effect of these new loans, or “innovations” should be ignored, their entrance into the market will certainly an increase in prices and new equilibrium… the problem is they also often cause overheating of the market and drastic overshooting of the that new equilibrium (remember these innovations also come with increased risk).

For example, in Edmonton prior to the boom typically 60% of households could finance and amount equal to the median home value in the, city and that number was steady for many years… at the peak even using the most exotic financing arrangements, only 39% could. If you limited to the loosest of what is offered today after the feds tightened standards that would drop to 36%. A very big shift, and unsustainable.

Today with “emergency” interest rates and prices having fallen from the peak and figuring in continued income growth the median home can currently be financed by about 50% of households. Better than it was, but still a ways to go before getting back to 60%… and interest rates shoot up much (even back to historical norms) it would take a great big bite out of that improvement (not to mention if amortizations get shortened to 30 years or tighten up downpayment rules).

The exact causes here may have varied between nations in name, but the effects were all the same. One must focus on the big picture and not tiny details. The lending bar was lowered… the amount of available credit exploded… demand explodes… supply is pinched short term… prices start rising… and the bubble becomes self feeding. Then add to that our human behavioural economics… mob mentality, speculation, irrational exuberance, etc, and it’s a lethal brew.

About the only thing that actually is different here is we don’t have to worry about our entire financial system collapsing as a result of the housing bubble popping… you see, the taxpayers have been on the hook for this one all along. Lucky us!

Nary a week goes by I don’t get a couple requests to revisit this post. I wasn’t thinking of doing it because prices are pretty much still in the same territory now as it was then, and inflation has been negligible… but my will has finally been broken, so let’s just giv’er!

Edmonton - Historical Residential Average (Nominal)

Like last time, we’ll start off giving you a look at the historical prices from a nominal perspective. That trajectory it took in 2006 still scares the hell out of me. Wow. Anyway, nominal prices are not that interesting or useful, so lets get on to the good stuff.

Edmonton - Historical Residential Average (Inflation Adjusted)

Alrighty then, here is the inflation adjusted graph (all figures are in today’s dollars). Obviously there are two periods that jump out at us, the big bubble there in the late 70′s/early 80′s, and the big spike from ’06 on.

You’ve likely noted the presence of a series of dotted lines, now we’ll touch on those. Starting with the top one, which shows us the peak of the prior bubble and how long it took for prices to return to that level. We had the price top out at ~$232,000 in August 1979… a level it would not again reach until March of 2006. A period of twenty-six years and seven months for the mathematically challenged.

The yellowish line is a (exponential) trend line/best-fit line. It shows that from 1962-to-present we’ve had roughly 1.6% annual appreciation. It theorized that our residential average should be closer to the $220,000-225,000 range currently. Thus the market is close to $100,000 over-valued at the moment relative to the long-term trend. At the peak of the market the spread was close to $150,000.

Finally I also included something of a price support line. These are used as a way of estimating the absolute bottom of a market, thus when prices near the price support line users start buying. That’s not even to say prices must reach that level (or couldn’t drop further for that matter), merely that if they do, it’s considered a trigger to buy as the price had overshot the mean.

For the price support line going back to 1962 it figures in an annual appreciation of about 2.0%. Which is actually steeper then the trend line, but started much lower. I’m not a big fan of these… that said, if prices ever do again approach it’s curve I would probably be VERY bullish too by then as the residential average would be below $200,000, so I guess they can’t be so bad.

Bubble Phases

I’d likely be one of the few that are bullish, as we’d be well into the “despair” phase of the bubble model. Such is the plight of herd mentality… just as it can feed a bubble, it was destroy it, and then some.

Me personally, I don’t think I’d even start looking until the average returns to around $250,000… and probably not think about letting the cheque book see the light of day until it was around $230,000. Of course this is all dependent on interest rates, if they stay at current levels for years on end obviously prices would settle higher… conversely if rates went much above 7% I’d expect prices to settle lower.

But that’s just me and my take of where the fundamentals point, and as Keynes said, the market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent… though just because it can doesn’t mean will, and after witnessing the clusterfuck his minions have delivered us to currently, I’ll take my chances.

With the recent rally in gold, we’ve been hearing a lot about precious metals. Actually ever since the financial meltdown last year the gold bugs out there has been much more boisterous… so I’ve finally broke down and prepared a post on gold and silver. This is another one that’s not particularly about real estate prices, but I will throw in a tie-in towards the end.

Historical Gold Prices

Here is a graph of the historical gold price per ounce, nominal prices in US and Canadian dollars, and in inflation adjusted Canadian dollars. Many investors generally look at precious metals as an inflation hedge, but it is prone to bubbles of it’s own… obviously as was witnessed in the early 80′s and is evidenced in the inflation adjusted figures.

For those thinking about buying gold you should take note of the tail end of this graph and that while gold has just recently reached it’s all time (nominal) high in US dollars, in Canadian dollars it actually peaked in the winter here and is a fair bit below that price currently.

So, if you’re thinking of putting money into gold, don’t just trade blindly based on what it’s value is in US dollars, you need to figure in the exchange rate into your calculations.

Historical Silver Prices

Here we have the same graph for silver, charts similar though it’s spike in 1980 was even more severe. Ignoring that, we can see that like gold, overtime it tends to hold it’s value without much if any appreciation, but is trending up the last few years.

Gold/Silver Price Ratio

For those interested in such things, here is a graph of the relationship between gold and silver prices. We can see the ratio has gone as high as 97.3 and as low as 17.2. Since 1971 the average has been 55.7, with a standard deviation of 18.1.

Gold and Home Prices

Finally we’ll do that tie-in with real estate, just for shits and giggles. This is a graph of the number of ounces of gold it would take to buy the “Average Residence” in Edmonton. There has been a fair bit of fluctuation, particularly in the 70′s. Over the period presented, the average has been 272, median 261 and standard deviation 101. So our current situation is right around normal, but it got as high as into the 500′s in 2007.

Interesting to note, the huge gold spike in 1980 coincided with the prior real estate bubble. While housing prices had somewhat plateaued from ’77-’82, the ratio plunged from north of 550, to less then 100.

Silver and Home Prices

Lastly, the same graph for silver. Average was 14,660, median 14,721 and standard deviation 5,723. In this case we’re currently well above the long term mean, and it’s interesting to look at the differences in pattern/scale of some of the movements between gold and silver with this measure.

So, take it for what it’s worth. Like any of the other commodity analysis’ I did earlier, any relationship with real estate appears anecdotal at best, but I included it because it’s been requested often. What I take from looking at this data is that like other assets, beware of bubbles, and be sure to figure in the exchange rate should you start putting your money into any investments.

Greetings freaks and geeks, hope you’re all ready for the long weekend. Before you go, here is the affordability update I promised.

As you may have noticed, suddenly this spring the word ‘affordability’ magically returned to the lexicon of the real estate pumper. A word nary whispered a year ago, but suddenly it’s convenient again. The improved affordability is obviously a result of the historically low interest rates… as the other two variables, incomes and prices, haven’t done anything to improve the equation.

To get a gauge of how interest rates stack up versus how they have in the past here is a graph of the average 5-year fixed rate taken out through May.

Interest Rates

As we can see, this is the first time we’ve dipped below 5% (4.62% as of May). Obviously not as low as some of the advertised rates the were circulating at the time, but it should remembered that those were not available to everyone, mainly just prime new borrowers, those renewing/renegotiating were often shit outta luck.

Also interesting to note just how rare it is that rates are under 6%. Even since monetary policies started targeting inflation to 2% in 1992, rates didn’t hit that level until 2003 until after the big shift post-9/11 and many nations lowered their inflation targets to 1%.

In any case, when combining the lower rates with the stripping of mortgage qualifying standards by the federal government in 2006 (over the course of that year borrowers went from needed 10% down and limited to 25 year amortizations, to 0% down/40 year amortization and 10 years of interest only payments), it’s not hard to see that it created something of the perfect storm for the price explosion we witnessed.

So, should be no surprise that another plunge of rates could manifest itself into another credit orgy as we’ve witnessed the last couple months, particularly in our culture of conspicuous consumption and instant gratification. This is not just unique to Alberta, this is right across the country, and even in the US where judging from the reaction apparently up to last month it was thought no one would ever buy a house again.

Affordability

Here is a graph of the income needed to qualify for financing to buy the median single-family home in Edmonton, charted with the median household income in the city. This is using the 32% gross debt service ratio, 10% down and using $170 per month in taxes and $100 in heating.

I took a sampling of 20 homes listed at/near $349,500 (the median SFH price), and they had an average and median annual property tax of $2050, which is roughly $170 per month, and the heating number at $100 may be a bit low, but for the pumpers sake we’ll use it just so I can’t be accused of skewing the numbers, maybe assume you have a ton of insulation and a helluva efficient furnace.

As we can see, there has been a major improvement in affordability, though it’s still a bit above the latest income figures (2007), which considering how 2008 ended and 2009 has played out, it’s probably safe to say they aren’t haven’t gotten much if any higher (and quite probably have started going down).

So, according to household income of $66,113 (in 2009 dollars), 10% down, 4.62% interest rate and $270 a month in taxes/heating a household should be able to qualify for about $300,000 with 25 year amortization. So, obviously as good as things got, prices are still about $50,000 above where they really should.

Of course, from what we’re hearing 10% down and 25 year amortizations are concepts rarely grasped in real estate now-a-days. Recent surveys have been telling us that the average downpayment is a mere 6%, even amoungst those already in the market, and the vast majority of amortizations are of the 30 or 35 year variety.

Recalculating assuming 35 year amortization and 10%, and only then do we truely near something resembling affordability… again, that’s assuming 10%, which evidently very few already in the market can even muster, much less the coveted first-time buyers.

But compared to what we witnessed the prior three years, any semblance of affordability seems like a dream come true. The market was correcting price wise by itself though last fall, but since then the trouble is that it’s interest rates doing all the work, and few expect them to remain all these record low levels.

Changes in Affordability

Recalculting affordability at current incomes and even 6% interest and affordability is again a thing of the past. Figuring in 25 year amortizations and 10% down, at 6% interest that would suggest the median home in Edmonton is overpriced by about $80,000… at 7% over $100,000… at 8% $120,000. You get the picture.

And do not think those interest rates are unrealistic, with governments running up massive deficits currently, they’re going to be flooding the bond market, forcing prices down and thus yields up… which we know, drives up borrowing rates. The ugly truth is rates even hitting the double digits isn’t out of the question.

For those hoping incomes will be able to make up the gap rather then prices, consider this. At current prices at May’s interest rates, to sustain these prices, incomes would need to be $76,500… at 6%, $86,000…. at 7%, $93,500… at 8%, $101,000.

Then compare that to the long term trend in incomes, which for 30 years hovered in the mid-50,000′s and only recently has broken well into the $60,000′s. Even if incomes managed to continue climbing, those gains don’t come overnight, and a return of even modest interest rates would still destroy any illusion of affordability and again leave prices to make up the difference.

Double disturbing in light of that people are coming in with increasing small down payments and longer amortizations. This just leaves them with negligible equity, and as a result even small decreases in prices leave increasing numbers of recent buyers underwater.

And for those thinking inflation might save you, take a look at that first graph and ponder the interest rates witnessed in the 70′s, 80′s and early 90′s… those are what comes with inflation, interest rates will kill you long before inflation will come riding in on its white horse.

Work

Again I apologize for the lack of updates, but as I’ve said, I am swamped with actual work, so blogging has taken a back seat… and unfortunately there is no end in sight just yet, so, it is what it is.

I seem to be getting a lot of e-mail from people who have recently bought for some reason, often accompanied by a series of calculations of why it was a good idea. They seem to be looking for some kind of validation, so I say I’m happy for them and wish them luck.

They then reply saying that they though I was against buying now… to which I reply, I am, the fundamentals of the market are extremely poor, and as such they are exposing themselves to a great deal of market risk all for very little potential upside, that their calculations are flawed (and how)… but that it’s their money, and if they’re happy with their purchase that’s all that should matter to them.

Most don’t respond again after that point, though the one that did, did so with a very succinct “Fuck you”… not terribly clever, but I do appreciate brevity. I guess this must be just a small taste of what Garth Turner gets on a daily basis over on his blog.

Anywho, enough of the self-aggrandizement. Today I’m going to take a look at the relationship between rents and incomes in Edmonton. Just recently Statcan came out with their most recent Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics. Notably because as far as I can tell it’s the only freely available source of historical market incomes in Canada. Unfortunately data is a year or two behind, but beggars can’t be choosers. Here is a look at the household median numbers for Edmonton through 2007, real (inflation adjusted to 2009 dollars) and nominal.

Incomes

Not surprisingly it was up over 2006, but not as far as many figured it would be. In inflation adjusted dollars it was up 5.3% year-over-year (from $62,750 to $66,100)… which would normally be quite impressive, but many had been prophetized these would be in the 10% range year-over-year (and even then it wasn’t nearly keeping pace with home prices).

It should be noted, average household incomes actually were up by over 10%… jumping from $76,875 to $86,150 (a 12.1% increase). But, as most know, average isn’t a great measure (as it tend to skew significantly), especially when the median is available. So, as per usual, we’ll be sticking with the median whenever possible.

Getting back to the graph, it is worth noting that this is by far the highest real incomes ever seen in Edmonton. Historically they generally have resided in the $50,000-$60,000 range, and as of this measure they’ve eclipsed the $65,000 mark for the first time ever.

Going forward it will be interesting to what happens to incomes… depending on the methodology and timing of when the survey was done, and how it corresponded with that little economic hiccup that hit in the fall. So, if incomes don’t drop for the 2008 SLID, I’d imagine they’ll take a big hit by time the 2009 numbers come out… but we are a year and two away respectively from knowing those.

Incomes and Rents

Here we have the nominal incomes and average 2 bedrooms rents charted out…and before you say, ‘but, but, but I thought you said averages suck?’ They do, but this is one of those cases where it’s the best measure we have, and for what it’s worth, in the case of rents it probably doesn’t tend to get skewed nearly as bad as averages for items like income would.

One would expect them to chart a similar pattern, and they appear to, but that could just be me cooking the scaling, so here’s a scatter plot.

Incomes and Rents

Unfortunately with rents only going back to 1990, this isn’t a major sampling, but they do appear to follow a general pattern and the R2 value is fairly significant at 0.8955. There are a few plots that are off a bit, but they’re all in the general area.

I didn’t find either of these graphs to be overly relatable though, so I devised another measure to graph out.

Incomes and Rents

This is rent as a percentage of gross (before tax) income. Whether you want to think of it as monthly or yearly, the number remains the same. From 1990-2007, the average was 16.20% and the median 16.17%. So, for every $100 a person was paid, they would pay about $16.20 in rent.

As we can see there are three quite noticeable spikes. In 1992, 2002 and 2007… ’92 being the highest, when it was over 18.5%. Going back to the first and second graphs, we can explain those spikes in ’92 and ’02. as a result of very noticeable and sharp drops in income… which looking at the general trend I would chalk up to aberrations in the survey results, thus incomes were probably reported a bit lower then they really were.

Incomes likely were dropping at those times, there were significant recessions those years, but I just suspect they didn’t drop to the degree witnessed in the data. There does appear to be a fair bit of fluctuation in the numbers over the life of the SLID, so the incomes have made a very jagged pattern as many of the spikes are probably largely due to over/under-reporting, and it’s really more the overall trend to pay attention to. So when the numbers on either side are relatively close, but the one in the middle is way high/low, it’s probably largely an aberration.

It is interesting to note that for 2007 though, incomes were actually up a fair bit, yet rents increased even more. So this is very unlike the other two spikes, as this one was rooted in a disproportionate hike in rent. This will only become more evident when the 2008 numbers come out, as there was another big rent hike that year.

Using the long term average/median of 16.2%, and guesstimating a continued growth of incomes to $70,000 that would suggest rents in the $950 territory… while as we discussed last week, currently rents are around $1050 currently, though the rental market is becoming increasing soft here, and decreases have already been witnessed in Calgary.

Time will tell, but for now at least it appears that first real estate prices broke from incomes, then rents did, and they now both appear to be higher then market incomes would suggest they should be. It’ll be interesting to see how it all plays out.

Anyway, I don’t think there is anything ground breaking in this data, but it is good food for thought. If you have any questions or comments, fire away!